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Articles 
Regulating the Workplace: 
The Three Models of Labor and Employment Law 
in the United States 
Reuel Schiller * 
The laws that regulate employment relationships in the United States 
consist of a mixture of state and federal laws. Far from being a unified legal 
regime, this patchwork of different laws require attorneys practicing Ameri-
can labor and employment law to develop expertise in the common law of 
the various states, as well as in state and federal statutory regimes. This arti-
cle will survey these different laws, and briefly describe how they interact 
with one another. 
When one describes American labor and employment law to a non-
American audience, two preliminary issues must be addressed. First, the 
United States has a federal system of government. Consequently, the laws 
governing Alnerican workers are not made by a single sovereign. Instead, a 
given employment relationship is governed by the laws of both the federal 
government and the state in which the employment is taking place. Thus, 
there is not a single law of elnployment relations in the United States. Instead, 
there are 51 different laws: the federal law, and the laws of the fifty states. 
In some areas of the law, federal law preempts state law. I ) In most doctrinal 
areas, however, the laws supplement one another. 
The second preliminary issue is that 49 of America 's 50 states are 
* Professor of Law, University of Califomia, Hastings College of the Law. This article is based 
on a lecture I delivered at the Nihon Uni versity College of Law in June of 20 II. My thanks to 
Dean Minoru Sugimoto and all the faculty and statT at Nihon for their extremely generous 
hosp ital ity. I am particularly indebted to Professor Yasuo Fukuda for making all the arrange-
ments for my visit and for acting as my host. I would also like to thank Professor Rikiya Saka-
mato, who acted as both a gracious host and a talented translator during my visit. F inally, I 
would like to thank Linda Lam for her research ass istance with this article. 
1) See Employee Reti rement Income Security Act, 29 U. S.c. §§ 1001 - 1461 (1974) ; San Diego 
Building Trades Council, Mil/men :s' Union. Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (\959). 
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common law jurisdictions.2) That means that large swaths of state employ-
ment law were not created by legislatures but have instead been developed, 
piecemeal, by state courts. Most people from non-common law systems 
find it perplexing, to say the least, when they find out that the most basic 
rules governing the employment relationship cannot be found in a statute 
book and were never passed by a legislature. Similarly, they are frequently 
puzzled by the power that a common law system gives to the American 
judiciary, even in areas in which the state and federal legislatures have acted. 
In that context, courts are given an extraordinary amount of deference 
when they interpret statutes. 
It is against this background of federalism and unusually powerful 
courts that American labor and employment law has developed. It has done 
so in three broad areas: the common law of the employment contract; 
statutory limitations and modifications of that contract; and the law of 
labor unions and collective bargaining. 
The most basic of these is the first: the common law of the employment 
contract. The contract law of each state has developed doctrines that regulate 
employment contracts. The most basic of these doctrines, one that has been 
adopted by a vast majority of the states, is the doctrine of "employment at 
will."3) This doctrine allows either party to an employment contract to 
terminate that contract at will, without penalty, for any reason, or for no 
reason at all. Workers can quit without repercussion, and employers can 
fire workers whenever they like. "At will" employment contracts are the 
default contract in employment relationships. Of course, in the rare instance 
that an employee has bargaining power, he may negotiate different terms - a 
requirement that an employer give a reason for dismissing a worker or a 
provision that guarantees employment for a certain number of years, for 
example. Only unusually skilled employees - athletes, television or movie 
stars, high ranking corporate executives - get these sorts of contracts. Most 
employment contracts are contracts of adhesion, in which the employer 
2) For general history of the common law in the United States, see John H. Langbein, Renee 
Lettow Lerner, and Bruce P. Smith, History of the Common Law: The Development of Anglo-
American Legal Institutions, pp. 473-556, 729-928 (2009). For specific monographs demon-
strating the importance of the common law in nineteenth-century America, see Leonard W. 
Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (1957), and Morton J. Horwitz, 
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977). For the continuing importance of 
the common law in twentieth-century America, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the 
Age of Statutes (1982); William E. Nelson, The Legalist Reformation: Law, Politics, and Ideology 
in New York, 1920-1980 (2001) .. 
3) See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY, 
118 (1976); Mark A. Rothstein, et aI., Employment Law 746-747 (3rd ed. 2004). 
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unilaterally defines the terms, and in which a provision of "at will" 
employment is always included. 
Because employment contracts are viewed by the common law as simply 
a particular fonn of contract, the common law rules that have developed 
for regulating contracts generally apply to employment contracts - the 
requirement of consideration, or the statute of frauds, for example. That 
said, the peculiar nature of the employment contract has led to some 
specialized rules. Most of these have to do with labor mobility. Courts have 
generally frowned on contract tern1S that limit the ability of workers to 
move from one job to another.4) Such moves are thought to be economically 
beneficial because they represent workers moving to what economists call 
their "highest valued use." The law, it is thought, should not limit the ability 
of workers to switch jobs if an employer is willing to offer them a higher 
salary. Indeed, this is one of the underlying premises of employment at 
will. An employee can quit for any reason at all. 
Because of this policy preference for worker mobility, courts have been 
reluctant to enforce modifications of the at will doctrine that limit it. Recall 
that most employment contracts are contracts of adhesion. Most workers 
do not have the bargaining power to negotiate specific tenus or resist an 
employer's decision to inseli a particular tenu. However, when employers 
have tried to insert tenus in contracts that prevent workers from leaving a 
particular job, courts have generally refused to enforce those terms. For 
example, courts will not allow specific performance to be a remedy for 
breaching an employment contract.S) Nor will they enforce penalty clauses 
that require employees to pay liquidated damages if they breach an 
emploYlnent contract. 6) Similarly, courts have rejected terms in employ-
ment contracts that have sought to make them "whole" - that a worker 
would not be paid until he finishes the period of time that the contract 
dictates. 7) Instead, regardless of what the contract says, courts will require 
an employer to pay an employee who is changing jobs for whatever period 
of that contract he has worked. 
Recently, most of the litigation surrounding worker mobility and employ-
4) See e.g., Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-J- A Corp. , 42 N.Y.2d 496 (1977); and 
Business Networks of NelV York. Inc. v. Compete NetHiork Solutions. Inc., 696 N.Y.S.2d 433 
(lst Dep't 1999). 
5) See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
6) See Wilson v. Clarke, 470 F.2d 1218 (1 st Cir. 1972) (stating that an employer may not require 
its exemployee to pay damages as a penalty to discourage job change) . 
7) See Thc"yer v. Dial Industrial Sales. Inc .. 189 F.Supp.2d 81 (S .D.N. Y. 2002); Longo v. Shore 
& Reich, Ltd , 25 F.3d 94 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
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ment contracts has centered around "covenants not to cOlupete."S) These are 
terms, unilateraily inserted into employment contracts by employers, 
that forbid an employee from working for a competitor of that employer 
for a certain period of time. They may also forbid that employee from giving 
a new employer the benefit of any knowledge or other intellectual property 
that he developed while working for the first employer. 
Courts have not forbidden covenants not to compete. However, in 
enforcing them, they have balanced the policies that underlie them (expec-
tation of worker loyalty, the desire to prevent one employer from free-riding 
on another employer's investment in a particular employee) with the idea 
that labor mobility promotes economic growth. Consequently, courts have 
limited them. Some courts have held that they must expire after a year, or 
that they may not prevent someone from working in a different field. 9) Other 
courts have limited the extent to which an employer can prevent his former 
employees from using the knowledge they have gained at their original job 
for the benefit of their new employer. 10) For example, California courts 
have held that employers cannot use employment contracts to prevent 
former employees frOlu giving new employers the benefits of their experi-
ence beyond the restrictions found in conventional intellectual property 
rights. Indeed, California employment law, which has developed in the 
shadow of the high tech boom, has been particularly reluctant to allow 
employers to limit the mobility of their workers. j 1) 
The use of the common law to promote worker mobility has been an area 
of the law in which courts have prevented employers from imposing 
contractual terms that harm workers. As such, it is quite unusual. Typically, 
courts enforce employment contracts as written, regardless of the lack of 
bargaining power that the vast majority of workers have. Consequently, 
protections for workers have been developed not by courts but by legisla-
tures. Indeed, legislative innovation characterizes the second area of American 
labor and employment law. 
This area consists of statutory restrictions on the content of common law 
employment contracts. One of the basic principles of the common law 
8) MarkA. Rothstein, et aI., Employment La\lV 710-712 (3rd ed. 2004). 
9) See JAK Productions, Inc. v. Wiza, 986 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1993); Pro Edge, L.P v. Gue, 374 
F. Supp. 2d 711 (N.D. Iowa 2005). 
10) See, e.g. , Kelly Services. Inc. v. Marzullo. 591 F. Supp. 2d 924 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
11) Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (stating that " [e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every 
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business 
of any kind is to that extent void). See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P, 189 P.3d 285 
(Cal. 2008); and Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F. 3d 748 (2008). 
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system is that legislative actions can always displace common law rules. 
The most straight-forward example of this displacement in the area of 
emploYlnent law is the federal government's Fair Labor Standards Act. 12) 
The FLSA mandates a minimum wage for all industrial and service jobs. It 
also requires mandatory over-time pay and prohibits child labor. Similarly, 
there is a federal statute regulating pensions and medical benefits that are 
frequently part of the compensation workers receive for their work. 13) Federal 
law also mandates minimum standards for workplace safety, including 
standards for workplace hygiene, limitations on exposure to toxic materials, 
and requirements of ventilation and light. 14) 
Both the federal minimum wage/maximum hour regime, and the occu-
pational safety and health regime permit state laws to supplement the federal 
minima. Consequently many states have their own minimum wage/maxi-
mum hours legislation that either supplements the federal legislation 
(requiring a higher minimum wage, for example) or that applies to workers 
not covered by the federal statute (agricultural workers are excluded by the 
FLSA but are covered by many state minimum wage laws, for example). 15) 
The most controversial, and most litigated, of the statutory restrictions 
on common law employment contracts are federal and state anti-discrimi-
nation laws. These laws modify the employment at will doctrine to forbid 
employers from basing any employment decision - hiring, firing, or 
promotion, for example - on the employees' membership within a particular 
protected class. Federal law prohibits discrimination based on race, ethnicity, 
sex, religion, national origin, age, or disability.16) Most states have similar 
prohibitions, and some states have more robust protections. California, for 
example, prohibits discrimination against homosexuals and defines "dis-
ability" more broadly than does federal law. 17) 
On their most basic level, anti-discrimination laws simply prohibit an 
employer from making an employment decision based on a person's race, 
sex, religion, or other protected category. An employer cannot refuse to 
hire someone simply because she is a woman. He cannot refuse to promote 
12) 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938) . 
13) 29 U.S.c. §§ 1001 - 1461 (1974). 
14) Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 651 - 678 (1970). 
15) Cal. Lab. Code §§ 200- 243 , 510, 1140- 1140.4 (West 2012) . 
16) See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.s.c. §§ 2000e- 2000e- 17 (1964); Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621 - 634 (1967); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.c. §§ 12111 - 12117 (1990). 
17) See California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12900- 12996 (West 
2008); Murray v. Oceanside Un[fzed School District, 79 CaL App. 4th 1338 (2000); Hope v. 
California Youth Authority, 134 Cal. App. 4th 577 (2005). 
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someone simply because they are a Buddhist. He cannot fire someone simply 
because they are black. However, discrimination laws have generated a 
host of more complicated doctrines that are not obviously related to the 
simple prohibition of intentional discrimination. For example, facially 
non-discriminatory employment practices that have a "disparate impact" 
on a particular protected group are also prohibited unless an employer can 
offer a legitimate business justification for that policy. IS) Thus, the require-
ment that an employee be able to lift a certain amount of weight for a job 
would violate the statute that prohibits sex discrimination if the require-
ment had the effect of disqualifying a greater number of women than men, 
unless the employer could demonstrate that the job at issue specifically 
required employees to lift that amount of weight. 
Employment discrimination statutes have also generated a host of prohibi-
tions on harassment in the workplace. The most obvious, and most uncon-
troversial, of these cases involve what is known as "quid-pro-quo harass-
ment" in which a supervisor requires sexual favors from an employee in 
exchange for refraining from taking an adverse employment action. 19) 
More controversial are claims based on what is called "creating a hostile 
work environment." 20) These cases have created a prohibition on treating 
people from a distinct group differently even though that treatment does 
not directly result in an adverse employment action such as being fired or 
demoted. Thus an employer may have violated employment discrimination 
laws if he allows his workers to use racial epithets around African American 
workers, or if he doesn't discipline workers who make sexist jokes in front 
of female employees. 
Perhaps the most controversial area of the law that employment discrimi-
nation statutes have generated has been with respect to remedial issues, 
particularly the requirement of so-called "affirmative action." Employers 
who have systematically discriminated against a particular protected class 
may be required to engage in "affirmative action" to ensure that this group 
is represented in appropriate quantities in their work force. That is, an 
employer must implement a preference for a particular group. He must 
discriminate in favor of that group. In rare cases a court may order such a 
18) Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S . 424 (1971); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e- 2 (1964). 
19) See e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S . 742 (1998). 
20) See generally Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that harassment, 
while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile work environment that is actionable 
under Title VII) . 
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remedy.2l) More often, an employer will engage in such a practice to avoid 
liability that is suggested by the fact that his workforce's racial balance is 
dramatically different from the population at large.22) 
While cases related to race and sex discrimination have traditionally 
been the most controversial, the area of employment discrimination law 
that has witnessed the most dramatic increase in cases involves discrimination 
against people with disabilities, the type of discrimination prohibited by 
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the ADA).23) Like other 
areas of employment discrimination law, the ADA prohibits employers 
from discriminating against people with disabilities. However, for obvious 
reasons, this type of discrimination cannot be totally banned. After all, not 
all discrimination against people with disabilities is driven by malign 
motives. The ADA does not require employers to hire a person for a job 
that their disability prevents them from doing. Airlines do not have to hire 
blind pilots. Symphony orchestras do not have to hire deaf conductors. 
Instead, the ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled when it is 
motivated by prejudice. For example, there is no reason why a paraplegic 
could not be a librarian (or a law professor). If an employer refused to 
hire that person because of his discomfort of being around a person with 
a disability, he would have violated the ADA. 
That requirement of the ADA has been uncontroversial. Indeed, it is 
nothing more than the general principle of employment discrimination law 
applied to another group: employment decisions should be made based on 
a person's genuine qualifications, rather than on some irrelevant, immutable 
attribute. However, unlike other areas of employment discrimination law, 
the ADA has additional requirements that have been a good deal more 
controversial. In particular, the law requires employers to "reasonably 
accommodate" the disabilities of their employees.24) Consider the paraplegic 
law professor. While his disability would not prevent him from teaching, 
hiring him would require his employer to accommodate his disability - he 
might have to add ramps to the lecture halls and buy special furniture for 
his office, for example. An employer might not wish to take on these 
expenses. Thus, the employer might have a non-prejudicial reason for not 
hiring the law professor: he cannot afford to spend the money to make his 
21) See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. ]49 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 
478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
22) See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber; 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
23) 42 V.S.c. §§ 12111 - 12117 (1990). 
24) 42U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117(1990). 
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workplace accessible to a person who uses a wheel chair. Yet the ADA 
would require the employer to hire the professor and make the changes to 
the workplace that were required to accommodate his disability. At a certain 
point a court might determine that the accommodations were no longer 
reasonable - they were too expensive, or they required changing the nature 
of the job - but otherwise, the employer would have to make the changes. 
Needless to say, American employers have objected to this infringement on 
their autonomy. 
The final area of the law of employment relations is the law of collective 
bargaining. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the NLRA) is a 
federal law that creates the right of private, non-agricultural employees to 
organize into unions.25) Many states have similar laws empowering govern-
ment employees and agricultural workers to organize. 26) Each of these laws 
prohibits a series of "unfair labor practices.,,27) The most basic of these is 
the prohibition of discrimination against workers who are engaged in 
"concerted activity.,,28) An employer cannot punish workers for attempting 
to organize a union or for joining together in some other manner to improve 
their terms and conditions of employment. Employers cannot threaten 
workers who engage in concerted activities, nor can they offer them 
inducements to discourage them from doing SO.29) Nor can employers 
create unions and force or encourage workers to join them.30) Finally, 
employers must bargain in good faith with a union that represents his 
workers.3l) 
The NLRA also prevents unions from interfering with the concerted 
activities of workers. They may not threaten or take adverse actions against 
workers who dislike the union or who are trying to organize to remove the 
union from the workplace. 32) The Act also prohibits unions from taking 
certain actions that Congress considers overly disruptive of the economy: 
sit-down strikes, in which workers occupy the workplace but refuse to 
work; secondary boycotts, in which workers picket businesses other than 
25) 29 U.S.c., sections 151-169 (1988). 
26) California's agricultural employees are covered by the Agricultural Labor Relations Act. 
Califomia Labor Code, sections 1140- 1166.3. California's public employees are covered by a 
variety of statutes, the most significant of which is the Dills Act. California Government Code, 
sections 3512-3524. 
27) 29 U.S.C., section 158. 
28) Id. , section 157. 
29) Id., section 158(a)(I). 
30) Id., section 8(a)(2) 
31) Id. section 158(a)(5). 
32) Id. , section 158(b)( 1). 
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their employer; and "feather-bedding," in which unions force employers to 
pay employees who are not actually working. 33) Finally, like employers, 
the Act requires unions to bargain in good faith. 34) 
Unlike Japanese labor law, American labor law operates under the 
principle of "exclusive representation.,,35) This means that the workers in a 
given workplace vote on whether they wish to be represented by a union. 
If a majority of the workers vote in favor of the union, then that unions acts 
as the representative of all the workers at the workplace, even those who 
voted against it. Thus, American labor unions are required to represent the 
interests of workers who are not union members and who may even actively 
oppose the union. These workers cannot get a different union to represent 
them, nor can they negotiate with their employer directly. Instead, the 
union negotiates a contract, known as a collective bargaining agreement, 
on behalf of every worker in the workplace. 
Unlike common law and statutory regulation of the employment contract, 
the American law of collective bargaining is not implemented by courts. 
Violations of federal labor law - firing someone for organizing a union, 
refusing to bargain in good faith, engaging in a secondary boycott - are 
adjudicated by an administrative agency called the National Labor Relations 
Board. 36) If a union and an employer cannot agree upon the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the dispute is resolved through the use of 
private weapons of economic conflict: strikes, lockouts, picketing, boycotts, 
the use of replacement workers. Once a collective bargaining agreement is 
in place, disputes over its implementation are resolved by arbitrators that 
are picked by the union and the employer.37) The role of courts in enforcing 
labor law is explicitly minimized. 
That concludes this world-wind tour through American labor and 
employment law. The best way to view the relationship among these 
three regimes is through a historical lens.38) The foundation of employment 
33) Id., section 158 (b)(4). 
34) Id., sections 158 (b)(3) . 
35) Id., section 159 (a). 
36) Id., sections 153, 154. 
37) United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co, 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers o.f America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car C01p., 363 U.S. (1960). 
38) For more details on the historical development of American labor and employment law in 
the twentieth century, see Nelson Lichtenstein, The State of the Union: A Century of American 
Labor (2003); Nancy MacLean, Freedom in Not Enough: The Opening of the American Work-
place (2006); Melvin Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (2000); and Karen 
Orren, Belated Feudalism: Labor, the Law, and Liberal Development in the United States 
(1991 ). 
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law is the common law contract, governed by the common law of each 
individual state. Over the course of the twentieth century, policy-makers 
realized that relying on nothing more than this cornmon law regime resulted 
in too many inequitable employment contracts. Because of the inequality 
of bargaining power between workers and their employers, employment 
contracts contained provisions that policy-makers considered unconscionable: 
wages were too low, working hours too high, working conditions were 
unsafe. Between the 1930s and the 1960s, policy-makers sought to solve 
this problem in two ways. First, they passed legislation that mandated 
particular terms of an employment contract: a minimum wage, a guarantee 
of certain working conditions, a promise not to discriminate against a 
person's race or sex. This solution presumed that the government knew 
what is best for workers, so it would place specific terms in every employ-
ment contract, regardless of what employers or workers wanted. 
The second solution to the problem of insufficient bargaining power was 
to increase that bargaining power and then let the workers negotiate what-
ever terms they could. The way that policy-makers chose to increase the 
bargaining power of workers was to promote the organization of unions. 
Thus, under the contemporary system of labor and employment law in the 
United States, workers get improved terms and conditions of employment 
in two ways. They get them when the state and federal governments 
impose specific terms on all employment contracts, and they get them if 
they organize into unions and use their increased bargaining power to get 
improved terms and conditions of employment. 
As this brief description of American labor and employment law and its 
historical development has demonstrated, state and federal law, common 
law and statutory law, all contribute to a patchwork of legal regimes 
governing the employment relationship. Practitioners must become familiar 
with dozens of common law rules and statutes. The irony of this complexity 
is that despite this abundance of law, American employers have more 
autonomy to define the nature of the employment relationship than do 
employers in any other advanced industrial democracy. The foundational 
principle of American labor and employment law is still the doctrine of 
at-will employment. Common law and statutory modifications of this prin-
ciple and the ability of labor unions to engage in collective bargaining have 
limited employer autonomy at the margins. Nevertheless, at its core, American 
labor and employment law still rests on the individual elnployment contract, 
and the inequalities of bargaining power that define its contents. 
